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Abstract
Random matching models have been used in Monetary Economics
to argue that money can increase the well being of all agents in the
economy. If the model features a finite number of agents it will be
shown that there is an equilibrium, analogous to the contagious equi-
libria described in Kandori (1992), that Pareto dominates the mone-
tary one. However it will be shown also that monetaty equilibria have
two important advantages: firstly, they are more plausible in large
economies in the sense that the lowest discount factor compatible with
monetary equilibria doesn’t depend on the population size, which is
not the case with contagious equilibria; secondly, it is more stable to
finite deviations in the following sense: no matter what the past has
been, future play of the equilibrium strategies will give players the
same payoff as if the equilibrium strategies were always followed.
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I. Introduction
A question that has been approached by the recent literature in monetary
theory is why an intrinsically useless object such as fiat money is widely used
as a medium of exchange. Specifically, this question has been posed in ran-
dom matching models (with a continuum of agents) where the introduction
of money can take society from a situation of autarchy to a situation that
exhibits frequent trade between different economic agents. In this context,
the usual interpretation is that the role of money is to serve as a way of
keeping track of the past. In this line of research, Kocherlakota (1998) states
that money is “a (typically imperfect) form of memory”.
The paradigm of random matching models has also been used in a dif-
ferent context – the context of the prisoners dilemma infinitely repeated.
Here, the question that has been posed is: to what extent can society ob-
tain cooperation in every stage when the available information is limited?
It’s a standard result that cooperation can be achieved when information
about past histories is available to all players; since in some situations this
assumption cannot be made, it is of interest to know if there is any hope
for cooperation. Work by Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), Kandori
(1992), Ellison (1994) and Gata (1996) suggest that the answer is yes.
The objectives of my work are several. First, I will try to show a relation
between these two literatures. More precisely, I think that in the framework
of the infinitely repeated random matching prisoners’ dilemma game the
stage game can be modified to capture the spirit of the random matching
models of money. In the terminology of the latest literature, the unique and
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the stage game will be interpreted as
autarchy; cooperation will be identified with a situation where one player
produces the consumption good and his opponent does not. The usefulness
of doing this exercise is that the intuition obtained by studying the infinitely
repeated random matching prisoners’ dilemma can be used to understand
better the role of money in our society. Moreover, I think that the games
studied by each of the two literatures belong to the same general class of
games because, in essence, they differ only in the stage game and in the
assumptions regarding the set of players; they have in common the fact that
both games are a denumerable repetition of a given stage game, they have
the same information restrictions resulting from random matching and also
the same equilibrium concept has been used in both.
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Second, I hope to get rid of the conventional assumption in monetary eco-
nomics that there is a continuum of agents. This assumption together with
the assumption that in each period, each player observes only the outcome
in his specific match implies that in the monetary economics models, in the
absence of money, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has autarchy as
outcome in every period. But, if the assumption of a continuum of agents is
abandoned, it might be possible to construct strategies that implement coop-
eration in every match as an equilibrium, adapting the contagious strategies
used by Kandori, Ellison and Gata, since this is the case in the infinitely re-
peated random matching prisoners’ dilemma game. This is possible because
they assume a finite number of players.
Third, I would also like to ask if there exists an equilibrium where the
players use an intrinsically useless object (“money”) to achieve cooperation.
If there exist such an equilibrium and if the contagious strategies also consti-
tute an equilibrium in this game, these equilibria could be compared. I think
that this comparison might be interesting because the contagious strategies
would have at least one advantage (for the players) over the use of money:
there would then be trade (the only Pareto optimal outcome of the stage
game) in every match, which is not necessarily the case in a monetary equi-
librium (if the consumer in a given match doesn’t have any unit of money,
there isn’t trade).
Given, then, that the use of money might have some limitation as a
medium of exchange, I think that a natural question is: what are the advan-
tages that it has over other alternatives that society has for implementing
exchange? A possible approach to answer this question is to argue that
money is the most efficient institution in some class of mechanisms, defined
in term of some “desirable” properties (see Hurwicz (1980)). It is the purpose
of this work to identify some of those “desirable” properties with respect to
which money “behaves better” than other possible mechanisms. This ex-
ercise might also help to clarify the role that money plays in society and
to explain why it is that money is so widely used, when there are several
alternatives available.
Summarizing, I intend to study a game that only differs from the in-
finitely repeated random matching prisoners’ dilemma in the stage game,
the stage game being a particular model of exchange similar to the one used
in the standard monetary random matching model (e.g. Kiyotaki-Wright).
This will get rid of the assumption of a continuum of agents. Finally, I will
try to compare monetary equilibria with contagious equilibria that have the
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property of implementing exchange in every match.
II. A Particular Model of Exchange
Consider the following payoff matrix, which wil be the general payoff
matrix for the game described in section (III):
i\j P NP
P −d, u− d −d, u
NP 0,−d 0, 0
Assume u, d > 0 and u − d > 0. Player i represents the producer and
player j the consumer; action P is interpreted as “produce” and NP as
“does not produce”. Finally, u represents the utility of consuming and d the
desutility of producing. The assumption that u − d > 0 then means that
there are potential benefits from trade.
In the standard random matching models of money it is usually assumed
that there are K types of agents specialized in production and consumption
in the following way: a type k person consumes good k and produces good
k + 1 (modulo K), for k = 1, 2, ..., K, where K ≥ 3. With the assumption
of independent random matching and equal proportion of types among the
population, the probability of an agent to be a producer is 1
K
, which is also
the probability of being a consumer; the probability of being none of these
is 1 − 2
K
. More generally, it could be assumed that there is a probability α
of being a producer and a probability of β of being a consumer, α+ β ≤ 1. I
will assume α = β = 1
2
; this assumption is made in order for the game to be
symmetric, and easier to analyse.
III. Random Matching Model
The game has I players indexed by i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., I} where I ≥ 4 is
an even number. In each period t ∈ N, the players are randomly matched
into pairs with player i facing player oi(t). It is assumed that the pairings
are independent over time and uniform so that
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Pr{oi(t) = j |ht−1} = 1
I − 1 ∀j 6= i
for all possible histories ht−1. At time t, each pair of players (k, ok(t)) play
the exchange game described in section (II). All players have discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1) and their payoffs are the discounted sum of the payoffs in each stage
game. At the end of period t, each player observes only the outcome of the
exchange game he and his opponent played. He does not observe the identity
of his opponent and does not observe the outcome of any of the games played
by other pairs of players.
IV. Contagious Equilibria
The above formulation follows closely the one in Ellison (1994) and so it
can be expected that his results carry through to this framework. The follow-
ing strategies are a natural modification of the ones supporting cooperation
in Ellison’s work:
In period 1, all players begin play according to phase I.
Phase I. In period t, play P if producer and NP if consumer.
If (P,NP ) is the outcome for matched players i and j, both play
according to phase I in period t+ 1.
If (NP,P ), (P, P ) or (NP,NP ) results in the game between
players i and j, then at time t+ 1 both play according to phase II.
Phase II. In period t, play NP . In period t + 1 play according to phase
II.
This strategies will allow the following:
Proposition 1 ∃δ∗ < 1 such that ∀δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) there is a sequential equilib-
rium in which (P,NP ) is the outcome in every match along the equilibrium
path.
Let f(k, δ) be player i’s continuation payoff from period t on when all
players are playing the above strategies and player i and the others are play-
ing according to phase II. If a player is a consumer in a given match, he won’t
deviate from the prescribed strategies, since he will be playing a strictly dom-
inant action. A producer won’t deviate during phase I if
d ≤ δ( u− d
2(1− δ) − f(2, δ)).
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This condition is sufficient because at information sets where he haven’t
observed any deviation he must believe that he is the first one deviating. It
simply says that the cost of producing today should be no greater than the
cost of starting the non-cooperative phase II.
In the phase II, if he meets a player in phase II, he won’t deviate because
if he does his continuation payoff is unaffected but he losses d today. If he
meets a player in phase I, he will play NP if
d ≥ δEj[f(j, δ)− f(j + 1, δ)]
where the expectation reflects player i’s beliefs over the number of players
who will play according to phase II at time t+ 1. A sufficient condition is
d ≥ δ(f(j, δ)− f(j + 1, δ)) ∀j ≥ 3.
The reason why it’s sufficient is as follows: if player i is in phase II then his
opponent in the match where he first saw something different than (P,NP )
must be in phase II as well. In the case where player i meets a player in
phase I, then that previous opponent must have met some other player.
The following lemma is analogous to lemma 1 in Ellison (1994); it ex-
presses that the loss of utility provoked by an additional player in phase II
decreases as the number of players already in phase II increases.
Lemma 1 Let k ≥ 1. Then f(k, δ) − f(k + 1, δ) ≥ f(k + s, δ) − f(k + 1 +
s, δ),∀s ≥ 1.
Proof. Note that f(k, δ) = Eωf(k, δ, ω). Let h(k, δ, ω) be player i’s
continuation payoff when he and players 2, ..., k and player I are playing
according to phase II. Clearly
Eωf(k + 1, δ, ω) = Eωh(k, δ, ω).
I show that
Eω[f(k, δ, ω)− h(k, δ, ω)] ≥ Eω[f(k + s, δ, ω)− h(k + s, δ, ω)]
by showing that the inequality holds for every realization of ω.
Define the set C(t, k, ω) by
C(1, k, ω) = {k + 1, k + 2, ..., I}
C(t+ 1, k, ω) = {i ∈ C(t, k, ω) : oi(t, ω) ∈ C(t, k, ω)}.
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C(t, k, ω) will be the set of all players who will be playing according to phase
I in period t when players 1, ..., k begin in phase II in period 1.
Define the set D(t, ω) by
D(1, ω) = {I}
D(t+ 1, ω) = D(t, ω) ∪ {i : oi(t, ω) ∈ D(t, ω)}
D(t, ω) gives the set of all players who will be playing according to phase II
in period t when player I begins in phase II in period 1.
Finally, let P (t, ω) be the set of players that are producers in t.
Note that the payoff to player 1 in period t differs between the situations
of f(k, δ, ω) and h(k, δ, ω) only if his opponent is a producer and plays P
when players 1, ..., k start in phase II but plays NP when players 1, ..., k and
player I start in phase II. Thus,
f(k, δ, ω)− h(k, δ, ω) =
∞∑
t=1
δtuI(oi(t) ∈ C(t, k, ω) ∩D(t, ω) ∩ P (t, ω))
The definition of C implies that
C(t, k + s, ω) ⊆ C(t, k, ω)
and so
C(t, k + s, ω) ∩D(t, ω) ∩ P (t, ω) ⊆ C(t, k, ω) ∩D(t, ω) ∩ P (t, ω).
It follows that in order to prove proposition 1, it suffices to show that
d ≤ δ( u−d
2(1−δ) − f(2, δ)) and δ(f(2, δ) − f(3, δ)) ≤ d. The strategy will be to
find an open interval (δ0, δ1) in which this two inequalities hold; this will
allow me to apply a result of Ellison (1994) that will prove proposition 1 for
δ ≥ δ0
δ1
.
Proof. of proposition 1.
Step1: ∃δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ( u−d
2(1−δ) − f(2, δ)) = d.
We may write
f(2, δ) =
∞∑
t=1
δtat
where at is the expected payoff in the t-th period after phase II begins. With
probability 1 all players will eventually be infected and start playing D and
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so at → 0. Also, |f(2, δ)| ≤ u1−δ and f(2, δ) < u−d2(1−δ) for δ big enough. We
then have
lim
δ→1
δ(
u− d
2(1− δ) − f(2, δ)) = ∞,
lim
δ→0
δ(
u− d
2(1− δ) − f(2, δ)) = 0.
By continuity we can choose δ∈ (0, 1) so that
δ(
u− d
2(1− δ) − f(2, δ)) = d.
Step2: ∃γ > 0 such that δ(f(0, δ)− f(2, δ)− (f(2, δ)− f(3, δ))) ≥ γ for
δ > δ.
Define the set D′(t, ω) by
D′(1, ω) = {I − 1, I}
D′(t+ 1, ω) = D′(t, ω) ∪ {i : oi(t, ω) ∈ D′(t, ω)}
D′(t, ω) gives the set of all players who will be playing according to phase II
in period t when players I − 1 and I begins in phase II in period 1.
Then (for a player different than I − 1 and I),
f(0, δ)− f(2, δ) =
∞∑
t=1
δtuµ(D′(t) ∩ P (t))
≥
∞∑
t=1
δtuµ(D(t) ∩ P (t))
since D(t) ⊆ D′(t), ∀t. Hence,
f(0, δ)− f(2, δ)− (f(2, δ)− f(3, δ))
≥
∞∑
t=1
δtuµ((D(t)\C(t, 2)) ∩ P (t)).
The second term of this sum is δuµ((D(1)\C(1, 2)) ∩ P (1)). If player 2 is
matched with player M in period 0 and is the producer under ω we have
{2, I} ⊂ I\C(1, 2, ω) and D(1, ω) = {2, I}.
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Together, these imply
D(1, ω)\C(1, 2, ω) = {2, I}.
From this, we know that the probability term µ((D(1)\C(1, 2)) ∩ P (1)) is
at least the probability that (2, I) is a match in period 0 and that (2, 1) or
(I, 1) is a match in period 1. This probability is 1
2(I−1)2 .
Hence, for δ as defined in step 1, we have for any δ >δ,
δ(f(0, δ)− f(2, δ)− (f(2, δ)− f(3, δ))) ≥ δ
2u
2(I − 1)2 := γ
Step 3: Let η < γ
2
. Then ∃δ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that δ0(f(0, δ0) − f(2, δ0)) =
d+ η and δ0(f(2, δ0)− f(3, δ0)) < d− η.
From step 1 we know that
d = δ(f(0, δ)− f(2, δ))
Since
f(0, δ)− f(2, δ) =
∞∑
t=1
δtuµ(D′(t) ∩ P (t)).
it follows that
∂
∂δ
(f(0, δ)− f(2, δ))
∣∣∣∣
δ
> 0
Thus we can choose δ0 ∈ (δ, 1) so that
δ0(f(0, δ0)− f(2, δ0)) = d+ η.
Because δ(f(0, δ)− f(2, δ)− (f(2, δ)− f(3, δ))) ≥ γ for δ > δ and η < γ
2
, it
follows that
δ0(f(2, δ0)− f(3, δ0)) < d− η.
Step 4: Apply Ellison’s lemma 2: Let G(δ) be any repeated game of com-
plete information, and suppose that there is a non-empty interval (δ0, δ1)
such that G(δ) has a sequential equilibrium s∗(δ) with outcome a for all
δ ∈ (δ0, δ1). Then there is δ < 1 such that ∀δ ∈ (δ, 1) we can also define a
strategy profile s∗∗(δ) which is a sequential equilibrium of G(δ) with outcome
a.
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By step 3, δ0(f(0, δ0)−f(2, δ0)) > d+ η2 and δ0(f(2, δ0)−f(3, δ0)) < d− η2 .
By continuity, ∃δ1 > δ0 such that for δ ∈ [δ0, δ1]
δ(f(0, δ)− f(2, δ)) > d+ η
4
and δ(f(2, δ)− f(3, δ)) < d− η
4
.
Define δ∗ = δ0
δ1
. Now, the construction of Ellison’s lemma 2 gives an
equilibrium for all δ ∈ [δ∗, 1).
The above result shows that, for sufficiently high discount factor, the ef-
ficient outcome can be attained in every match as an equilibrium outcome.
This is a good property of the contagious equilibrium but it relies on the
threat of a rather severe punishment for deviators: if a player deviates, he
might expect that sooner or later every one in the society will stop coop-
erating. Because of this extreme feature, this equilibrium also has some
unpleasant properties, that will be discussed below.
Proposition 1 gives a sufficient condition in term of the discount factor
so that the “contagious equilibrium” exists in this particular model. It is
conceivable that it depends on the number of player; moreover it might be
the case that as the number of players increases the cutoff discount factor
approaches 1. This is indeed true, but a stronger result would be to consider
the limiting behavior of a discount factor with the property that for any
smaller δ the contagious equilibrium wouldn’t exist. In other words, my plan
is: for every I find a discount factor δ(I) with the property that if δ <δ(I),
then the contagious strategies are not an equilibrium. After δ(I) has been
defined, I will try to show that lim
I→∞
δ(I) = 1.
Lemma 2 ∀I ∃δ(I) such that for δ <δ(I) the contagious strategies are not
an equilibrium.
Proof. Define δ(I) := inf{δ ∈ [0, 1) : δ( u−d
2(1−δ) − f(2, δ, I)) = d} where
f(2, δ, I) =
∑
δtatI , where at is the expected payoff in the t-th period after
phase II begins. The set {δ : δ( u−d
2(1−δ) − f(2, δ, I)) = d} is non empty (step
1 of proposition 1) and closed; hence δ(I) is well defined and belongs to
{δ : δ( u−d
2(1−δ)−f(2, δ, I)) = d}. Since for δ = 0 one has δ( u−d2(1−δ)−f(2, δ, I)) = 0,
it follows that δ(I) > 0. Finally, if δ <δ(I), then δ( u−d
2(1−δ) − f(2, δ, I)) < d
and so the contagious strategies are not an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 δ(I)→ 1 as I →∞.
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Proof. First note that atI =
u
2
Pr(find a player in phase I in period
t) ≤ u
2
,∀t. Since Pr(find a player in phase I in period t) ≥ 1− 2t+1
I−1 , it follows
that lim
I→∞
atI =
u
2
.
This implies that lim
I→∞
f(2, δ, I) = u/2
1−δ because∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
t=0
δtatI − u/2
1− δ
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∞∑
t=0
δt
u
2
−
∞∑
t=0
δtatI ≤ u
2
∞∑
t=0
min{ 2
t+1
I − 1 , 1}δ
t
≤ u
2
(
I∑
t=0
2t+1
I − 1δ
t +
δI+1
1− δ
)
=
u
2
(
2
I − 1
1− δI
1− δ +
δI+1
1− δ
)
→ 0 as I →∞.
.
Define h(δ, I) := δ( u−d
2(1−δ) − f(2, δ, I)).
Since δ(I) < 1∀I, then lim sup
I→∞
δ(I) ≤ 1. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that lim inf
I→∞
δ(I) < 1. Then, given ε > 0, there is N such that inf
I≥N
δ(I) < 1−ε.
Thus, there is a convergent sequence {δn}∞n=1 ⊂ [0, 1−ε] such that h(δn, n) =
d, ∀n and δ := limδn ∈ [0, 1− ε].
It follows that lim
n→∞
h(δn, n) = d > 0; but also lim
n→∞
h(δn, n) = δ(
u−d
2(1−δ) −
u/2
1−δ ) =
δ
1−δ (−d2) < 0, a contradiction.
Thus lim
I→∞
δ(I) = lim sup
I→∞
δ(I) = lim inf
I→∞
δ(I) = 1.
Proposition 2 says that in large economies it is unlikely to observe peoples
behaving as prescribed by contagious strategies. An additional drawback of
the equilibrium using this strategies is that it isn’t global stable, in the sense
of Kandori (1992). Roughly speaking, an equilibrium is globally stable if
no matter what the past has been, future play of the equilibrium strategies
will give players the same payoff as if the equilibrium strategies were always
followed. Not surprisingly, contagious equilibrium doesn’t satisfy this prop-
erty because if someone deviates then, conditional on such history, payoffs
will approach zero. In fact, there is only one history consistent with such a
property.
Definition 1 An equilibrium sustaining payoffs v = (vi)i∈I is globally stable
if for any given finite history of actions h,
lim
t→∞
E(fi(t)|h) = vi, ∀i ∈ I,
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where fi(t) is player i’s continuation payoff at t.
Proposition 3 The contagious equilibrium is not globally stable.
Proof. Consider the one period history where every player played NP
in the first period. Then fi(t) = 0, ∀t > 1
V. Money
Since we observe frequent trade between people in the ’real world’, it
is important for economic theory that (P,NP ) be a stage game outcome
in many matches. The only Nash equilibrium of the game represented by
the payoff matrix in (II) has (NP,NP ) as outcome, which is clearly not
Pareto optimal. Indeed, the only Pareto optimal outcome is (P,NP ). This
implies that to achieve Pareto optimality society must have a way to achieve
“cooperation”. Therefore, an objective of a recent literature in monetary
theory is to argue that the introduction of money in an economy helps to
implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium (P,NP ).
In this section, it is supposed that players can use money, which, in the
context of the model, may be described as a physical good that can be stored
but doesn’t affect players payoffs. I will be interested in monetary exchange,
which can be interpreted as a social mechanism that works as follows: when
a consumer meets a producer, if they both agree to trade, then the producer
produces the good for the consumer while the latter gives one unit of money
to the producer.
To be more precise about the meaning of the monetary exchange mecha-
nism, I will describe, for each match, the actions available to the players, the
outcome function (mapping players actions into outcomes) and the evolution
of players’ money holdings. Regarding the actions available to the players, I
assume that in every match (i, j), they can choose from the set {Y es, No}.
If Q : {Y es, No} × {Y es,No} → {P,NP} × {P, NP} denotes the out-
come function, then I assume that Q satisfies: Q((Y es, Y es)) = (P,NP )
and Q((Y es,No)) = Q((No, Y es)) = Q((No,No)) = (NP,NP ). Finally,
regarding the evolution of players’ money holdings, if m′ : {Y es,No} ×
{Y es,No} → {0, ...,M} × {0, ...,M} denotes next period vector of money
holdings it is assumed that
m′((Y es, Y es)) =
{
(mi + 1,mj − 1) if mj ≥ 1
(mi,mj) otherwise
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m′((Y es,No)) = m′((No, Y es)) = m′((No,No)) = (mi,mj).
I will define a monetary strategy for a given player as follows: in every
information set where he is a consumer chose “Y es”; in every information set
where he is a producer and is opponent has money chose “Y es”; finally, in
every information set where he is a producer and is opponent has no money
chose “No”. If this strategies form a sequential equilibrium, it will be referred
as a monetary equilibrium.
In order to keep the model tractable, I assume that there is only one unit
of money. Furthermore, I assume that each player starts the game with that
unit of money with probability 1
I
. This assumption will be used when dealing
with global stability.
As in section (IV ), I will show that the monetary strategies constitute
an equilibrium if the discount factor is high enough. Note first that when a
given player is a producer and is matched with a consumer without money
he will choose “No”. This is because if he choses “Y es” he would receive
−d in that period but his continuation payoff would be the same as if he
had chosen “No”. Also, in the same situation, the consumer is indifferent
between “Y es” and “No” and so it is (weakly) optimal to chose “Y es”. It
is then sufficient to concentrate on those matches in which the consumer has
money, since in those where the consumer doesn’t have money players are
chosing optimally.
Let (i∗, j∗) be a given match and assume that player j∗ (the consumer) has
money. For l = i∗, j∗ and for δ ∈ (0, 1), player l’s continuation payoff when
he holds one unit of money will be denoted by V (l, 1, δ) and V (l, 0, δ) will
denote his continuation payoff when he holds zero units of money. Because
of the symmetric structure of the game, both V (l, 1, δ) and V (l, 0, δ) don’t
depend on l, and so in what follows I suppress l as an argument. Then,
player i∗ will chose “Y es” if
d ≤ δ(V (1, δ)− V (0, δ))
and player j∗ will chose “Y es” if
u ≥ δ(V (1, δ)− V (0, δ)).
That is, the discounted value of money, which is measured by δ(V (1, δ) −
V (0, δ)), has to be high enough in order to compensate for the cost of ac-
quiring it (here, the cost of producing the consumption good), but not too
high.
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Proposition 4 ∃δ′ < 1 such that ∀δ ∈ [δ′, 1) there is a monetary equilib-
rium.
Proof. If all the players are following the monetary strategy, a player that
starts a given period with one unit of money will, if he gets to be the consumer
in his match, receive u in that period (since Q((Y es, Y es)) = (P,NP ) and
the payoff for the consumer of this action pair is u as described in figure
1) and start next one with zero units of money (by the definition of m′)
. If he gets to be the producer then his current utility will be zero (since
Q((No, Y es)) = (NP,NP ) and the payoff for the producer of this action
pair is 0 as described in figure 1) and he will start next period again with
one unit of money (m′((No, Y es)) = (mi,mj) = (1, 0)). Hence,
V (1, δ) =
1
2
(u+ δV (0, δ)) +
δ
2
V (1, δ).
Similarly we can derive an expression for V (0, δ) : consider a player that
starts a given period without money. If she is a consumer then she won’t be
able to consume and so she will start next period without money; if she is
a producer and meets a player without money, she won’t produce and she
will again start next period without money. Finally if she is a producer and
meets the players with money, she will produce and will start next period
with one unit of money. Therefore,
V (0, δ) =
δ
2
V (0, δ) +
1
2
(
1
I − 1(−d+ δV (1, δ)) +
(
1− 1
I − 1
)
δV (0, δ)
)
.
It follows that,
V (1, δ)− V (0, δ) = 1
(2− δ)I + 2(δ − 1)(d+ (I − 1)u).
For δ ≤ 1, then δ(V (1, δ) − V (0, δ)) < u. If δ ≥ 2d
u+d
, then δ(V (1, δ) −
V (0, δ)) ≥ d.Defining δ′ := 2d
u+d
, it follows then that for δ ≥ 2d
u+d
the monetary
strategies are a sequential equilibrium.
From the proof, we see that δ′ doesn’t depend on the number of players.
This is in sharp contrast with section (IV), where the set of discount factor
for which there might be contagious equilibrium becomes very small when
the number of players is big. Moreover, it can be shown that the value of
money increases with the size of the economy, suggesting that the benefits
of holding money are bigger in large economies.
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Corollary 1 (a) lim
I→∞
δ′(I) = 2d
u+d
(b) for δ >δ′, δ(V (1, δ, I)− V (0, δ, I)) increases with I.
Proof. Part (a) follows immediately from the proof of proposition 7.
For (b), it’s enough to show that d(V (1,δ,I)−V (0,δ,I))
dI
> 0. Since
d(V (1, δ, I)− V (0, δ, I))
dI
=
δ(u+ d)− 2d
((2− δ)I + 2(δ − 1))2
the result follows.
The intuition for the last result is clearer in the limiting case, when δ
approaches 1. One has lim
δ→1
δ(V (1, δ)−V (0, δ)) = 1
I
d+ I−1
I
u, which is a linear
combination of u and d. This expression illustrates the potential benefits of
money: by obtaining one unit of money a player will be able to consume in
the first period where he happens to be a consumer afterwards. Also, since
by accepting money he reduces the amount the player he meet has, if he
meets him again, he will be excused to produce. However, the latter just
gives him utility of d, while the first gives him u. As I increases, it is less
likely that he receives only d because is less likely that he meets a particular
player.
In section (IV) it was shown that the contagious equilibrium was not
globally stable. The next proposition shows that, on the contrary, the mone-
tary equilibrium is. This is somewhat expected because monetary strategies
depend on the past only by the amount of money a player brings from the
previous period. The expected payoff at a given period is either V (1, δ) or
V (0, δ), depending on whether he has money or not. However, asymptoti-
cally, the probability of having money will be equal to 1
I
, regardless of the
initial condition. Hence,
Proposition 5 The monetary equilibrium is globally stable.
Proof. Note first that the payoff sustained by the monetary equilibrium
is 1
I
V (1, δ) + I−1
I
V (0, δ), for every player.
Let h be a given history and let th be the length of h. That is, h gives
the initial vector of money holdings, who met who and the actions players
played from t = 1 until t = th. So, it will be possible to determine for each
player if he will start period th + 1 with money or not.
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Let i ∈ I and let pit, t ≥ 1 denote the probability that player i has money
at the beginning of period th + t, given history h. As remarked above p
i
1 is
either zero or one. Then,
E[vi(th + t)|h] = pitV (1, δ) + (1− pit)V (0, δ),
and so it suffices to show that lim
t→∞
pit =
1
I
.
Since
pit =
1
2
pit−1 +
1
2(I − 1)(1− p
i
t−1), t ≥ 2
it follows by induction that,
pit =
1
2(I − 1)
t−2∑
n=0
(
1
2
− 1
2(I − 1)
)n
+ pi1
(
1
2
− 1
2(I − 1)
)t−1
.
Hence,
lim
t→∞
pit =
1
I
.
VI. Discussion
Random matching model were introduced in monetary economics in order
to derive a role for money endogenously. Given the friction imbedded in the
model, it was shown that the introduction of money in the system would
help people to exchange their goods and to specialize in production (Kiotaki
and Wright (1989), (1993)). The emphasis of this approach was on efficiency
properties of money, that is, on the welfare gains that economic agents would
benefit in moving from a nonmonetary to a monetarized economy, and at least
implicitly it was the reason justifying the widespread use of fiat money.
However, society has available some forms of community enforcement and
it can use them to sustain a full efficient outcome as an equilibrium situation.
An example of such a form of community enforcement is the contagious
equilibrium described above1, where the failure of exchange between two
1To my knowledge, the strategies supporting such equilibrium were first introduced by
Kandori (1992). Corbae et al.(1999) also use them in a monetary economics model that
is close to the one presented here, but they use a different equilibrium concept.
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people will trigger a return to autarchy for society as a whole. This suggests
that the rationale for money should at least include some other features
besides efficiency.
The question that motivated this present work was: why did monetary
trading settled as the main trading mechanism in developed economies? This
question is far from being answered here, but nevertheless I would like to refer
two properties that monetary trading mechanism possesses, and that might
be important in justifying it as a customary practice.
A first property is that it seems to work as well in small as in large
economies. When a person refuses to exchange his goods for money, this
information will be transmitted when this person runs out of money and he
will be punished at that time since he won’t be able to consume. So far
as it doesn’t become more likely for a person to be able to sell the goods
he produces or to buy the goods he consumes as the number of people in
the economy, then this implicit punishment does not depend on the size of
the economy. This is, however, in sharp contrast with the case of contagion.
Here, when a person refuses to give the commodities he produced to some
other person, he can expect that cooperation will break down in society. But,
if the economy is large, chances are that will not get punished in the near
future. That is, when he is one of many agents in society, he can reasonably
expect to fail to abide by the social norm and get by with it for a long time.
Thus, it seems to be more natural that money circulates in large economies
and in some sense this seems to be in agreement with the evidence that only
in this century did fiat money become the general medium of exchange.
A second property is that monetary exchange seems to be somewhat
“safe”. What I mean is that if people make some mistakes, or if they fail to
understand or to accept the mechanism at the beginning, even in this case
all the agents in the economy will tend to be as well off as if nothing of that
had occurred. In this sense, monetary exchange is almost independent of the
past which allow society some form of forgetfulness. On the contrary, this
is not the case with contagion. In this case, a single mistake by someone
will make all the trading collapse. So, it also seems that money has a more
important role in more complex and unstable economies, which again seems
to match some simple empirical evidence.
Although these properties seem to be important, are they sufficient to
make money the “best” exchange mechanism? Again this question will not
be answered here but it is worthwhile to mention some other mechanisms
that have been studied and compare the monetary exchange mechanism with
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them. In Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) study of social norms, they
specify a class of mechanisms in which a label is attached to each person and
those labels completely determine players’ behavior. Kandori (1992) states
that it is possible to design such mechanism in order to allow for frequent
trade in a way that is globally stable and independent of population size.
Kocherlakota (1998b) describes a mechanism that in particular can imple-
ment trade using either a physical object that is divisible, nondisposable and
observable or two divisible objects, not necessarily concealable or disposable,
object that essentially play the role of labels2. Finally, Townsend (1987)
comparing the relative efficiency of portable concealable objects as record-
keeping devices with electronic telecommunications, concludes that the latter
is a dominant technology in the sense that it allows a bigger value for weighted
average across the agents in the economy of their ex-ante expected utility.
Do monetary trading mechanisms have some advantages when compares
with those mechanisms? As described above, “label” mechanisms appear
to be quite appealing, but they make the assumption that trading partners
can observe each other’s labels. An attractive feature that money has is
that, if we think of labeling people as having money or not, then it is true
that trading partners can observe each other’s labels. However, the general
“labels” mechanisms described in Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995)
and Kandori (1992) simply assume that; furthermore, their mechanism has
the property that if the agents could choose to conceal their label, some
would choose to do so.
This last problem, regarding the observability of the labels, is overcome in
Kocherlakota’s two-money mechanism. The potential benefit of the monetary
trading mechanism over that mechanism, is that the former is quite complex,
involving a mapping from individual histories into the decimal expansion of
money holdings.
Finally, money seems to be a much “cheaper” alternative than electronic
telecommunication proposed by Townsend (1989). In the context of finding a
mechanism to allow exchange in a given society, his mechanism would require
that after ever exchange, the people involved in it had to communicate its
outcome to some centralized bureau that everyone in the economy could
access. In a large economy, this would probably be very expensive.
2At first sight those mechanisms seem to be independent of the population size, but
not globally stable.
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VII. Conclusions
I have considered a particular model of trade that has as its defining
features a finite number of agents and limited information resulting from
random matching. This two elements have been used in the context of the
infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game to study social norms and also in
monetary economics. I argued that both literatures have common elements
and as a result I considered a model that allow for a direct comparison of
the results of both.
The motivation for this approach was the existence in the infinitely re-
peated random matching prisoners’ dilemma game of an equilibrium that
implements the efficient outcome in every match. I believe that this opens
the question of why monetary trade is customary in actual economies instead
of the mechanism of that efficient outcome. The model I considered provided
an example of a framework where money does have at least two advantages:
it behaves relatively better in large economies and it is more stable to finite
deviations.
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